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While Beijing has repeatedly signed up to multilateral sanctions against North Korea, it is 
widely regarded as having failed to strictly enforce those sanctions. Indeed, China's 
deepening economic engagement with the country has led observers to debate the causes of 
this seemingly duplicitous approach. Constructivist and realist approaches have relied on 
state-centric frameworks that serve to reduce Sino-North Korean relations to the high politics 
of Beijing-Pyongyang diplomacy in the context of broader geopolitical dynamics. We argue 
that such approaches pay insufficient attention to the profound rescaling of the Chinese state 
in recent years and the implications this process has for bilateral relations. We shed light on 
how Sino-North Korean relations are being driven by actors at multiple scales and by a 
multitude of objectives as a result of decentralisation and marketisation alongside increasing 
geographical unevenness within China and new challenges to continued capital accumulation. 
North Korea has come to play an increasingly important role in efforts to facilitate economic 
recovery in the northeastern border regions through serving as spatial fix for Chinese 
manufacturing capital. These new cross-border flows of capital and labour suggest an 
emerging pattern of Sino-North Korean relations that is by no means static but in 
considerable flux. 
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Beijing’s key role in approving multilateral sanctions directed against North Korea, its failure 
to strictly enforce those sanctions, and its deepening economic engagement with the country 
has led to widespread debate regarding the causes of this seemingly inconsistent or even 
duplicitous approach. From a social constructivist perspective, one argument has been that 
China's actor identity is composed of various contradictory role conceptions, some of which 
are based in the country's past and some commensurate with China's new-found global stature. 
As a result, there has been a deepening contradiction between China's desire to be seen as 
responsible global partner that does not associate with rogue states, and its identity as an 
ostensibly socialist one-party state that refuses to engage in actions that could lead to North 
Korea's downfall (Noesselt 2014). Other social constructivists have made reference to China's 
more traditional norms that are alleged to shape the country's relations with its near abroad. 
These include an emphasis on stability in China's border regions combined with a siege 
mentality born out of a history of encroachment by imperialist powers. In this approach, 
relations with North Korea are further problematised, however, by China's expectation of 
deference on the part of its near abroad alongside a perceived sense of cultural superiority 
amidst Confucian expectations of reciprocity (Easley & Park 2016).  
From a mainstream realpolitik perspective, on the other hand, it has typically been argued 
that China's North Korea policy should be viewed as a straightforward reflection of Beijing’s 
strategic interests in maintaining North Korea as a buffer state for the purposes of countering 
US influence in the region. This imperative is seen as having its origins in the early 20th 
century when the Korean peninsula formed the corridor through which imperial Japan 
facilitated its military expansion into China. As such, support of North Korea as a bulwark 
against US encroachment can be seen as a consistent objective since the Korean War (Habib 
2016, p.60). Thus, while China and North Korea in reality share little in common in terms of 
historical ties, ideological stance, political and economic programmes, or diplomatic 
interaction, Beijing fears that Korean reunification may lead to US military presence on 
China's doorstep and thus prefers maintenance of the status quo (Ji 2001, p.398). This means 
that while Pyongyang’s nuclear tests may bring some short term disruption to Sino-North 
Korean relations, China's engagement with the country is likely to continue as long as 
tensions remain in US-China relations remain tense (Kim 2016; Kong 2017). By extension, 
Beijing’s failure to fully enforce the multilateral sanctions that it has signed up to is 
consistent with the fear of the negative impact that a North Korean collapse may have on 
3 
 
China itself (Moore 2008). As such, the emphasis that China's grand strategy places on 
regime security means that it is unlikely that Beijing will take actions leading to instability in 
North Korea (Horowitz & Ye 2006). Furthermore, China's deepening economic engagement 
with North Korea can also be seen as functional to this broader grand strategy.  
In this paper, we argue that these views pay insufficient attention to the ongoing 
transformation of the Chinese state that has taken place over the past four decades and the 
implications that the ongoing decentralisation of political authority in China has had for the 
latter's relations with North Korea. We argue that the Chinese state has undergone a profound 
process of rescaling in the form of the marked decentralisation of authority from the centre 
towards provincial, municipal and other local actors. Existing social constructivist and 
realpolitik approaches thereby pay insufficient attention to how the key agents in day-to-day 
Sino-North Korean relations are increasingly local governments alongside profit-oriented 
private actors, both of whom pursue goals that are not reducible to those of the central 
government authorities. What this means is that accounts that focus on realpolitik or the 
norms underpinning Beijing's grand strategy are only able to give a partial account of 
bilateral relations between the two countries. In reality, the rescaling of political authority and 
the diversification of actors involved in China's external relations means that the country's 
relations with North Korea has come to be underpinned by a broader range of concerns and 
imperatives than simply those captured via analysis of the high politics of Beijing-Pyongyang 
relations.  
However, we also focus on how this rescaling of the Chinese state has led to increasingly 
uneven development within the country and on the implications of efforts to facilitate 
development in China's northeast for Sino-North Korean relations. Existing analyses of these 
efforts have tended to emphasise their origins within the context of China's increasingly tense 
relations with the United States (see Lee 2014), thereby seeing geo-economic strategies 
largely as a means of achieving geopolitical objectives (Yoon & Lee 2013). In contrast, we 
focus on their role as responses on the part of political actors at multiple scales to the 
increasing unevenness of China’s development and to the challenges this unevenness poses to 
social stability and to the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Drawing on the 
literature on rescaling and the decentralisation of political authority, we examine how the 
diversification of governmental and private actors constitutive of Sino-North Korean relations 
serve to problematise the state-centredness of social constructivist and realpolitik approaches. 
As we argue, ongoing processes of decentralisation and marketisation have resulted in new 
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patterns of geographical unevenness and in new forms of social struggles, particularly within 
China's northeast. This has led to state-led re-imagining of national space in which North 
Korea has come to play an increasingly important role in efforts to facilitate economic 
recovery in the northeast. In this sense, North Korea has increasingly come to play the role of 
spatial fix for Chinese manufacturing capital, particularly in the northeastern border regions. 
This ongoing process of rescaling and the resulting emergence of new cross-border flows of 
capital and labour suggests an emerging pattern of Sino-North Korean relations that is by no 
means static but is in considerable flux. 
The Rescaling of Political Authority in China  
Existing Realpolitik and Constructivist approaches to Sino-North Korean relations are 
essentially based upon a static "black box" conception of the state. By naturalising the state as 
a transhistorical concept, such approaches fail to convincingly explore either the state's 
historical origins or its ongoing transformations. State-centric conceptions thus fall into what 
John Agnew has referred to as the "territorial trap," whereby states are typically reified as 
fixed units of sovereign space. These approaches serve, however, to de-historicise and de-
contextualise processes of state formation and transformation as well as obscure the 
interaction between processes operating at different scales (Agnew 1994, p.59). Though it is 
debatable whether state-centric approaches have ever adequately captured the changing 
relationship between the state and the international system (Lacher 2003), they are 
particularly inadequate given the profound transformations that territorial states have 
undergone since the world economic crisis of the 1970s. As Bob Jessop has argued, the 
widespread rescaling of political authority that has taken place globally over the past four 
decades has typically taken the form of the relative denationalisation of statehood. This 
process has involved the transfer of powers previously located at the national-territorial level 
up towards international organisations, downwards to regional or local states, or outwards to 
cross-national alliances between local metropolitan or regional states. This process amounts 
to a de- and re-territorialisation of authority that has served to radically reshape hitherto 
mutually exclusive, formally sovereign, spatially segmented national states (Jessop 2004, 
p.15).  
In this sense, the effort to escape the "territorial trap" of state-centrism does not entail a 
denial of the state's continued relevance as a locus of social power, but rather a rethinking of 
the meaning of both state territoriality and political space (Brenner 1999, p.41). In contrast to 
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widespread arguments in the 1990s concerning the "retreat of the state" (Ohmae 1990; 
Strange 1996), the reorientation of the state's development policies towards the promotion of 
global economic competition has been closely intertwined with this re-territorialisation and 
rescaling of the state. This process of rescaling should therefore be seen not simply as a 
defensive reaction against globalisation but as a concerted strategy to create new scales of 
state regulation to facilitate and coordinate the globalisation process. Rescaling can thus be 
interpreted as a strategy of political restructuring that aims to enhance the locationally 
specific productive forces of each level of state territorial organisation (Brenner 1999, p.66). 
A corollary of this process, however, is that fragmented and decentralised state apparatuses 
and quasi-market actors have increasingly pursued their own independent interests and 
agendas overseas, generating conflict-ridden, incoherent policy output (Hameiri & Jones 
2016, p.73).  
It is important here, however, not simply to describe these processes of re-territorialisation 
and rescaling but to explain them with reference to struggles between social forces, since as 
Gough (2004) argues, changes of scale in political-economic processes are often associated 
with changes in class relations and are an outcome of social contestations. The nexus between 
social struggles and the rescaling of political authority is also closely linked to and is 
facilitative of what David Harvey refers to as the "spatial fix." As Harvey argues, limits to 
capital accumulation in any one geographical locale can create a surplus of capital that cannot 
profitability be re-invested. However, such limits emerging from the internal contradictions 
of capital can be resolved through a process of geographical restructuring and expansion 
(Harvey 1982, p.390). The resulting spatial fix thus involves the export of money capital, 
commodities or productive capacities or imports of fresh labour powers from other regions as 
a means of overcoming existing limits to capital accumulation (Harvey 1982, pp.427–428). 
Labour struggles and rising labour costs can be a particularly powerful driver of such 
processes (Silver 2003), as can the need for new sources of raw materials in order to maintain 
rapid economic growth. Thus, as Harvey argues, it is the “irresolvable” internal 
contradictions of capitalism that have accounted for its extraordinary expansive dynamics 
since its emergence. Continual spatial re-ordering and geographical expansion is, therefore, 
as central to capitalism as technological change (Harvey 2001, p.24). 
This framework based on the rescaling of the state and the spatial fix therefore provides an 
alternative to widespread understandings of China as Westphalian state par excellence. In 
line with the critique offered above, such understandings remain unable to capture the 
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radical shift from the self-contained pattern of auto-centric development pursued under Mao 
Zedong towards the transnationalised economy of the post-1978 era. They tend to neglect 
the decentralisation of political authority and pluralisation of actors constitutive of China's 
external relations, and in particular, how such processes have occurred in response to the 
internal and external challenges to the ruling CCP's  legitimacy. These challenges have taken 
the form of social and class-based struggles from below as well as external challenges in the 
form of China’s position within the uneven development in the East Asian region and 
beyond.  
Deng Xiaoping's decision in the late 1970s to pursue economic liberalisation can thus be 
understood as a strategic response to the stalling of the country's economic development and 
to shifts in China's external environment. Economic stagnation was a result of the systematic 
inefficiency and waste associated with Soviet-style central planning and the subsequent 
failure of developmental Maoism to establish a viable alternative accumulation regime based 
on mass mobilisation. By the time of the death of Mao Zedong, there was as a result a 
widespread social mandate for change within China, particularly amongst those who had 
suffered under the political mobilisations of the Mao era and those who worked in the 
agricultural collectives or state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and were subject to often 
irrational and stifling administrative direction from above (White 1993, pp.21–50). The 
challenge of addressing this economic stagnation was viewed as particularly acute given the 
context of the extraordinary growth rates achieved by the US allies of Japan, South Korea, 
and Taiwan. Uneven development in East Asia both exerted a strong impression on China's 
leadership of the country's economic backwardness as well as provided practical policy 
alternatives (Vogel 2013). Together with the shifting dynamics of the Cold War in the form 
of the Sino-Soviet split and rapprochement with the US, this provided the impetus and 
opportunity for China to pursue an outward-oriented strategy of greater integration into the 
international division of labour (Cumings 1989).  
This shift in development strategy involved marked scalar shifts in governance both 
upwards towards the level of international organisations and downwards towards provincial 
and local governments as well as to non-state actors. The upward scalar shift is clearly 
represented by China's entry into the United Nations in 1979, membership of the World 
Trade Organization, increased voting rights in the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank, a rising stature in forums such as the G20, and the establishment of new 
institutions of global governance such as the New Development Bank, the Contingent 
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Reserve Arrangement and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. As Wang and Rosenau  
have argued, many of these initiatives would have been hard to contemplate only a decade or 
two before, and thus represent a significant move on the part of the Chinese government 
toward closer identification with the international system (Wang & Rosenau 2009, p.10). 
Contemporaneous with this upward shift has been the decentring of political authority down 
towards the provincial, city, and county level. Planning and decision making powers in 
particular have been transferred from the central government down to local governments, 
thereby providing opportunities for local governments to stimulate economic growth (Wei 
2001, p.9). Political decentralisation has therefore also been a process of marketisation, 
whereby the dismantling of the state planning and allocation system has resulted in party-
state elites at all levels losing some ability to control economic activity. At the same time, 
power has passed into the hands of non-state actors, including managers, producers, 
consumers, and increasingly, private and foreign economic actors (Breslin 2000, p.209). It is 
important to note, however, that there have also been periodic and partial reversals to this 
trend, such as with the introduction of the tax sharing system in 1994 (Ahmad et al. 2002), 
thus suggesting the emergence of a contested multi-scalar structure rather than a complete 
rescaling away from the central state.   
The question of the precise relationship between local state and capital emerging from this 
process has been widely debated. Jean Oi has argued, for example, that local states and 
markets in China should not necessarily be viewed as being in an antagonistic relationship 
with each other. Fiscal reform assigned local governments property rights over increased 
income, thereby creating strong incentives for local officials to pursue economic development 
in their regions. With parallels to the Northeast Asian developmental states of Japan, Taiwan 
and South Korea, this merging of state and economy characterises a new institutional 
development model referred to by Oi as "local state corporatism," whereby local government 
coordinates economic enterprises as if it were a diversified business corporation (Oi 1992, 
pp.100–102; see also Blecher & Shue 2001). One manifestation of this new scalar 
configuration has been the emergence of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) as an example of 
the downward shift in political authority, thereby demonstrating that decentralisation was 
simultaneously a process of internationalisation (Breslin 2000, p.211). However, while 
China's reforms were in many respects a conscious emulation of the Northeast Asian 
developmental state model, the relative lateness in world-historical time of China’s 
integration into the regional and global economy meant that “national development” was a 
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much more difficult goal to pursue. In a context whereby transnational production networks 
have become dominant, China's post-1978 reforms took the form of "shallow integration" 
into the global economy (Steinfeld 2004), whereby economic growth became heavily reliant 
on inward FDI and overwhelmingly centred on the Eastern and Southern coastal regions. By 
the early 2000s, however, China's development was increasingly beset by the 
overaccumulation of capital, as manifest in the country's towering foreign exchange reserves 
(Su 2012, p.502). Beijing thereby responded to this challenge by promoting a "going out" 
strategy, whereby domestic SOEs were encouraged to invest abroad to secure cheaper labour, 
resources and achieve geographical or institutional proximity to markets (Yeung & Liu 2008).  
The outward expansion of China's SOEs should not be viewed as simply directed by the state, 
however. Deng Xiaoping's reforms meant that SOEs became increasingly profit driven and 
characterised by the kind of separation between ownership and management that could be 
found in Western firms. Indeed, Chinese SOEs are often larger in size and capacity than the 
government agencies that are supposedly meant to provide oversight over them (Gonzalez-
Vicente 2011, pp.405–409). Deng's reforms also led to the rapid expansion in private 
enterprises, many of which have also been increasingly internationalising their activities 
through overseas direct investment (Ge & Wang 2013). This suggests that the 
decentralisation of political authority in China has led to an institutional arrangement that is 
in fact much less coherent and unified than that of the developmental states of Northeast Asia 
in which the state exerted considerable influence over the investment activities of enterprises 
(Amsden 1989; Wade 1990). Indeed, as Jude Howell argues, the Chinese state should be 
understood more as a polymorphous state that assumes multiple, complex forms and 
behaviours across time and space, and defying any definition which reduces it to a single 
actor (Howell 2006, p.275). 
China’s post-1978 reforms and the concomitant rescaling of political authority has, however, 
created new challenges for the CCP due to the manner in which these processes have 
exacerbated regional disparities in the country. Prior to the reforms, China's fiscal system was 
characterised by centralised revenue collection and inter-regional resource transfers. As noted, 
however, fiscal decentralisation allowed localities to retain certain portions of their revenues 
for local spending. The reforms also increased local governments' discretion over the 
investment process, and the divergence in local inputs play a key role in explaining the 
dramatic unevenness (Wei 2001, pp.10–12). Indeed, the central state deliberately treated 
provinces differently during the process of decentralisation, with coastal provinces given 
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rights to seek foreign investment earlier than inland  provinces (Breslin 2000, p.215). The 
resulting regional disparities thus posed serious challenges in terms of political stability. As 
we argue in the following section, the economic decline of China's northeast has been a key 
manifestation of this process, and as a result, regional authorities have placed increased 
emphasis on economic cooperation with North Korea as a means of revitalising the region.  
The Northeast Phenomenon and State-led Responses 
In the midst of China's deepening regional disparities, the country's northeast remains 
somewhat unique in that it constitutes the country's primary rust belt but also includes 
relatively undeveloped border regions. Following 1949, the Chinese state had made large-
scale investments in heavy and chemical industries in the region, to the extent that it became 
known as the "cradle of Chinese industry" (Chung et al. 2009, p.110). Many of China's 
largest SOEs in the steel, chemicals, heavy equipment, automobiles and defence equipment 
sectors were located in the region. The northeast has, however, fared badly in the context of 
the growing inter-provincial inequality that characterized China’s growth during the 1990s 
(Fan and Sun, 2008). As noted, this was due to the fact that the reforms led to a shift in the 
locus of China's economic dynamism towards the labour-intensive export-oriented industries 
located in the coastal regions and from SOEs to private and foreign-invested enterprises. 
This "Northeast Phenomenon" (dongbei xianzhuang) was not simply a result of the region's 
ageing heavy industrial structure, however. The region's relative geographical isolation and 
the fact that both Jilin and Heilongjiang provinces are landlocked meant that the northeast 
was ill-placed to take advantage of the investment by overseas Chinese networks that formed 
the impetus of China's post-1978 growth. In addition, the northeast was relatively slow to 
encourage inward direct investment from nearby South Korea and Japan. Official economic 
cooperation between northeast China and these countries remained limited until the 1990s. 
Due to this combination of factors, the northeast's trade reliance in 2001 was just 20.37 per 
cent, less than half of the national average of 43.57 per cent, and foreign direct investment to 
the region recorded US$ 3.19 billion at the same year, accounting for just 6.89 per cent of the 
national total (Kim 2012, p.45). With its ageing industrial base and limited new investment, 
the northeast's share in China's overall industrial production saw a sharp decline from 17 per 
cent in the late 1970s to just 8.6 in 2002 (Kang 2005, p.194).  
The northeast's economic decline has been of increasing concern to the authorities. 
Consequently, local governments in the region took a leading role since the 1990s in seeking 
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to revitalise the region through cooperation with neighbouring countries. For example, the 
Tumen River Area Development Programme (TRADP), sponsored by the United Nations 
Development Programme, was aimed at establishing a Northeast Asian economic regime 
centred on China, North Korea, South Korea, Russia and Mongolia, with Japan adopting the 
position of observer. TRADP aimed to promote regional economic integration through a 
number of mechanisms including plans to establish a duty-free shipping and processing zone 
inclusive of the North Korean cities of Rajin and Chongjin, the Chinese cities of Hunchun 
and Yanji, and the Russian city of Vladivostok (Kim 2001, pp.388–390). However, TRADP's 
progress was erratic due to the security tensions on the Korean peninsula and limited interest 
on the part of corporations in neighbouring countries in investing in the Sino-North Korean 
border area of the Tumen River.
i
 The project thus failed to achieve the goals of the Jilin 
provincial authorities, who were its most enthusiastic supporter. Furthermore, there were 
tensions between central and local governments in a number of member states with regards to 
the extent to which cross-border regional cooperation should occur (Hughes 2002). Beijing 
was also seemingly wary of North Korean initiatives to promote border region developmental 
projects. In addition to providing little support to North Korea’s Rajin-Sonbong Free 
Economic and Trade Zone in the early 1990s, Beijing appeared to adopt a negative stance 
towards Pyongyang’s attempts to develop the Sinuiju Special Administration Region near the 
Chinese city of Dandong in the early 2000s. 
Despite the slow progress of multilateral cooperation in the region, China has since the mid-
2000s made significant advances in bilateral cooperation and exchange with North Korea. As 
noted in the introduction, a number of observers have interpreted this deepening of Sino-
North Korean economic cooperation within the context of the former President Obama 
administration's "pivot to Asia" and the challenges posed by North Korea's nuclear test. 
Seung-Ook Lee has argued, for example, that increased tensions with the United States led to 
a shift in the way Beijing seeks to maintain North Korea as a strategically important buffer 
state. Whereas Beijing had previously stood in the background and allowed local government 
and business to take the lead, 2009 saw a switch to a state-level strategy of engagement with 
North Korea (Lee 2014, p.182; see also Kim 2016). This view of geopolitically-driven 
economic cooperation bares strong parallels with arguments made concerning China's 
relations with Southeast Asia. Yoshimatsu, for example, has argued that China's engagement 
with the Mekong Region is similarly driven by strategic objectives, such as the cementing of 
China's influence in Southeast Asia at the expense of the United States, the demonstration of 
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leadership potential in East Asia, and securing a route to the Indian Ocean (Yoshimatsu 2010, 
p.92; see also Dosch & Hensengerth 2005). 
Though Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to Pyongyang in 2009 did see the announcement of 
several high profile cooperation projects, it should be noted that in reality Beijing's attempts 
to promote economic exchange between the northeast and North Korea have earlier origins 
and can be seen in part as a response to economic decline and to its potentially destabilising 
social consequences. The latter included the large-scale social unrest amongst laid off 
workers in the northeast in the early 2000s (Chung et al. 2009, p.112) and the recognition of 
the role that economic exchange with North Korea might play in promoting the northeast's 
economic recovery. The poor profitability of northeastern SOEs in the northeast and the 
failure to attract sufficient new investment into the region has led to bankruptcies and to 
widespread unemployment and social unrest across the region (Lee 2008, pp 69–73). As a 
result, in the early 2000s, the northeast accounted for about 18 per cent of the country’s total 
urban unemployed, despite the fact that the region accounted for just 8.5 per cent of China's 
overall population (Kang 2005, p.195). Northeastern cities such as Liaoyang in Liaoning 
Province and Daqing in Heilongjiang Province have subsequently seen protests involving 
tens of thousands of workers. At the same time, the ethnic Korean (Chaoxianzu) population 
in Jilin Province's Yanbian Autonomous Prefecture adjacent to North Korea poses potential 
challenges to national unity and stability in China. Historically regarded as a "model 
minority," ethnic Koreans in China have not engaged in any explicit acts of unrest such as 
those seen in Tibet in 2008 and in Xinjiang in 2009. Nonetheless, the Chinese government 
has, as with other ethnic minorities, historically had concerns about the possibility of an 
emerging national consciousness amongst ethnic Koreans (Luova 2009, p.442; Kwon 2011, 
p.240), a concern that is evident in state-led attempts to propagate an understanding of history 
that unambiguously cements China's claim over the region and its people (Hays Gries 2005). 
It is true that such concerns may be dissipating to a degree due to outward migration of 
around one million ethnic Koreans over the past two decades. Nonetheless, the northeastern 
border regions benefit from a number of central government politics designed to promote 
border trade as a means of tackling similar concerns in China's border regions more generally 
(Thompson 2011, p.14). 
As a result of these challenges, the central and provincial governments' increased emphasis 
on promoting the economic revitalisation of the northeast can be seen as a new stage in 
China's reform era. On a visit to Changchun in August 2003, Premier Wen Jiabao announced 
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that henceforth the industrial rehabilitation of the northeast would together with a programme 
to develop China’s western regions form the "two wheels of the East-West cooperation" that 
would propel China’s economic growth in the 21st century (Li 2004, p.2). In October 2003, 
the CCP and the State Council formally marked the launch of the Revitalise the Northeast 
programme. In its early stages, however, this programme placed overwhelming emphasis on 
the restructuring of inefficient SOEs and large-scale infrastructure projects. For the provincial 
governments, these efforts were initially seen as insufficient and as doing little to facilitate 
the “external opening” (duiwai kaifang) of the northeast (Kwon 2011, p.243; Kim 2012, p.46). 
As such, Beijing began from the mid-2000s to place more emphasis on cooperation with 
North Korea as a means of further facilitating the northeast's economic recovery. In June 
2005, the State Council adopted an active strategy of encouraging Chinese enterprises in the 
northeast to "go out" in order to gain access to raw materials and mineral resources. This 
strategy included a proposal made by Jilin provincial government for a "Road Port Zone 
Integration Project" (lugangqu yitihua) (Won 2011, p.47). This project would thereby 
facilitate Jilin Province’s strategy of “borrowing the harbour to access the sea” (jiegang 
chuhai), whereby landlocked Jilin Province would acquire rights to use North Korea's warm 
water ports on the latter's northeastern coast in order to overcome its isolation. Beijing 
formally raised these cross-border regional development plans with North Korea in 
September 2007 at the Third Meeting of the China-North Korea Science and Technology 
Economic Trade Joint Committee. In response to North Korea’ subsequent request for a 
written proposal, the related documents compiled by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce were 
subsequently submitted to the North Korean embassy in Beijing in April 2008 (Won 2011, 
p.55). As such, Wen's visit to Pyongyang in 2009 merely marked the public announcement of 
the projects that would form the basis of the Road Harbour Zone Integration Project, and thus, 
their adoption cannot easily be regarded as a response to Obama's "pivot to Asia" and North 
Korea’s 2009 second nuclear test. 
Decentralisation and Sino-North Korea Economic Cooperation  
China’s implementation of cross-border infrastructure projects with North Korea has also 
taken the form of more targeted regional development plans. In July 2009, the State Council 
ratified the Liaoning Coastal Economic Belt Development Plan (herein, Liaoning CEBDP) 
aimed at the further revitalisation of the province's industrial base. The plan was first 
proposed by Liaoning provincial government in 2005, and sought to connect the six coastal 
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cities of Dalian, Dandong, Jinzhou, Yingkou, Panjin and Huludao into a single regional 
industrial hub (Xinhua 2009). The State Council's plan also included the development of 
Dandong New City, which with downtown Dandong, Dandong Harbour, and the 
neighbouring North Korean Hwanggumpyong-Wuiha SEZ would form a more focused 
regional industrial zone. A further key component of the Plan was the building of the New 
Yalu River Bridge, connecting Dandong New City with the North Korean city of Sinuiju at a 
cost of US$350 million.  
In August 2009, the State Council also approved the Changchun-Jilin-Tumen (abbreviated to 
‘Changjitu’) Pilot Area, covering the cities of Changchun and Jilin as well as Hunchun in 
Jilin Province's Yanbian Autonomous Prefecture, along with Rason SEZ and Chongjin city 
on North Korea's northeastern coast (Sohu News 2009). In line with Beijing's Road Port Zone 
Integration Project, the Changjitu plan similarly promotes access to North Korea's harbours. 
Access to North Korea's Rajin harbour, for example, would mean that raw materials could be 
shipped from China's northeast to its southern provinces more quickly and cheaply than by 
road or rail transport. It would significantly reduce shipping times from China's northeast to 
the key markets of South Korea and Japan, and would relieve pressure on Liaoning 
Province's Dalian port. Access to North Korean harbours would also mean that Jilin province 
border city of Hunchun in the ethnic Korean Yanbian region would find itself only 93km 
from its nearest port rather than current 1,300km land journey to Dalian port (Lee 2011). As 
such, the plan would help to reduce the geographical isolation of the northeast and thereby 
tackle the unevenness of China's development. However, the benefits of access to North 
Korean ports would extend even beyond the northeast towards the Russian Far East and 
Mongolia. To facilitate these regional and international linkages, the Changjitu plan involved 
the renovation of Quanhe-Wonjong bridge on the Sino-Korean border and the building of a 
new road from the border to Rajin, while Chinese companies have been involved in 
renovating piers in the North Korean city of Rason. 
The role in which cooperation with North Korea plays in such regional development plans 
needs to be qualified somewhat. The position that local governments in the region take 
towards such cooperation tends to be shaped by geography. Liaoning Province already has 
coastal access, for example, and the province as a whole arguably has less to gain from 
investments in improving transport infrastructure with North Korea. The border city of 
Dandong, on the other hand, is heavily reliant on cross-border economic exchange, and as 
discussed in more detail below, has taken the lead in several important cooperative initiatives. 
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As a landlocked province, Jilin Province, and the Yanbian Autonomous Prefecture in 
particular, have more to gain in terms of cooperation with North Korea (Lee 2014, pp.185–
187).  The importance of North Korea to the regeneration of the northeast is thus 
unsurprisingly more concentrated in the border regions. Nonetheless, it is difficult to 
understand the substance of Sino-North Korean economic cooperation separately from the 
wider context of northeastern regional development efforts.  
As such, to simply reduce China's North Korea strategy to the desire to maintain a buffer 
state on the Korean peninsula amidst growing geopolitical tensions can only at best provide a 
partial explanation. It is the case, however, that with Pyongyang's continued nuclear and 
missile tests there have been growing tensions between Beijing and Pyongyang as well as 
between Chinese central and provincial governments over how to deal with North Korea. 
Beijing has not only signed up to increasingly stringent sanctions against North Korea but has 
also adopted its own follow up measures. In April 2013, for example, China's Ministry of 
Transport and Transportation sent a notice indicating the execution of UN Security Council 
Resolution 2094 to lower-level government organisations (Ministry of Transport 2013). 
China's four big state-owned banks stopped conducting business with North Korea, and on 
the 7th of May, the Bank of China closed its accounts with North Korea's Foreign Trade 
Bank (Won 2013, p.59). Furthermore, following North Korea's third nuclear test in 2013, 
Beijing appears to have abandoned the pursuit of large scale economic cooperation projects 
with North Korea. In a context of rising US-China tensions, this again suggests that 
understandings of China's engagement exclusively in realpolitik terms or as resulting from 
relatively static norms are problematic. Despite a worsening external climate, North Korea 
has not been included in Xi Jinping's flagship One Belt One Road strategy, and there has 
been no discussion of North Korea's entry into the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. 
This is despite the fact that both regional development projects in the northeast explicitly seek 
to strengthen the northeast's economic cooperation with neighbouring countries through the 
construction of rail, road, electricity networks, pipelines and economic corridors 
(Government of China 2015).  
Beijing's increasing reluctance to pursue large-scale cooperation projects with North Korea 
does reflect in part the increased tensions over the latter's nuclear programme, but more 
importantly, it reflects the fact that many existing high profile projects have simply failed to 
progress as planned. For example, the New Yalu River Bridge remains unopened despite 
having been completed in 2014. Indeed, there has apparently been no effort on the North 
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Korean side to connect the bridge to the existing road network, and thus, the bridge has 
remained unused and, for many observers, stands as a testament to the futility of engagement 
with North Korea. Despite Beijing's apparent change of heart, however, regional 
governments in the northeast have maintained efforts to pursue smaller scale economic 
cooperation projects with North Korea despite increasingly stringent international sanctions. 
For example, in October 2015, Liaoning provincial government opened the China-Korea 
Border Trade Zone in Dandong's New City, which allows tax-free purchase of goods by 
border residents up to a value of 8,000 Yuan (US$ 1,260) per day (Voice of America 2016). 
Though the success of this endeavour, like that of Dandong New City itself, depends in part 
on the opening of the New Yalu Bridge, more successful border economic zones have been 
established in Hunchun and in Ji’an. 
These continued efforts at the regional level can be understood as a result of the fact that, 
within the context of a broader economic slowdown in China, the northeast has in recent 
years seen a particularly sharp economic decline. In 2015, for example, Liaoning's economic 
growth rate reached just 3 per cent, the lowest amongst China's 31 administrative provinces. 
In 2016, Liaoning’s recorded growth rate fell further to -2.5 percent. Jilin and Heilongjiang 
provinces fared somewhat better, but these northeastern provinces were still the lowest 
performing provinces in the country. At the same time, economic exchange with North Korea 
has increased in importance to the region. In Jilin Province, for example, North Korea 
accounted for 12.1 per cent of the province's total exports (US$ 6.25 billion) in 2014, making 
North Korea Jilin province's biggest export destination for the first time, exceeding Japan, 
Russia and South Korea (Bae & Yoon 2015, p.14). Thus, while high profile engagement 
projects promoted by the central government appear to have ground to a halt, regional 
governments have continued to encourage the expansion of economic exchange with North 
Korea. 
Engagement with North Korea as Spatial Fix 
 
The rescaling of political authority in post-1978 China has meant that Sino-North Korean 
relations have come to be shaped by a range of state actors at the central and regional level, 
and as such, China-North Korean relations cannot be reduced to a singular geopolitical logic. 
However, processes of decentralisation and marketisation have also meant a shift away from 
government towards private actors primarily oriented towards the pursuit of profit. Indeed, in 
contrast to the aided-trade and government commodities of the past, the vast majority of 
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Chinese trade and investment with North Korea has since the early 2000s been profit oriented 
and conducted largely by either private enterprises or individual traders based in the 
northeastern border cities. While this reflects in part the marketising dynamic of China’s 
reforms, it also reflects the fact that North Korea too has adopted reform measures that have 
strengthened enterprise autonomy and increased motivation for enterprises for engaging in 
profit-seeking activities (Gray & Lee 2017). As a result, trade and investment between the 
two countries take the form of spatial fix for Chinese manufacturing capital rather than 
simply reflect the vicissitudes of Beijing-Pyongyang relations or of international sanctions. 
 
The majority of trade and investment between China and North Korea has been centred 
around mineral resources. Reflecting demand in the Chinese economy, the growth in North 
Korean exports of anthracite to China is particularly noteworthy, reaching a level of US$ 1.38 
billion dollars in 2013. However, the slowdown of the Chinese economy, the end of the 
global commodity boom, and the tightening of environmental regulations in China have more 
recently led to a sharp decline in anthracite prices from about 100 dollars per ton in 2011 to 
50 dollars per ton in early 2016.ii North Korea initially responded to this decline by increasing 
the physical quantity of coal it exports, and as such, in 2015, North Korea replaced Russia as 
China's third largest source of coal. However, the continuing decline in price meant that the 
total value of exported anthracite fell to US$ 1.05 billion dollars that year. In a similar 
fashion, China Customs data shows iron ore exports to China grew from a value of 
US$529,000 in 2000 to $324 million in 2011, but thereafter declined to a value of $72.8 
million in 2015. These fluctuations in anthracite and iron exports further underlines the fact 
that importers of North Korean mineral resources are largely Chinese enterprises making 
decisions on the basis of profit rather than political factors. 
 
There has also been increasing Chinese investment in North Korea, including investment in 
mineral resources but also in the manufacturing, logistics, retail and transportation sectors. In 
2003, investment approved by China's Ministry of Commerce into North Korea was recorded 
at just US$ 1.12 million dollars, but by 2012, this had grown to US$ 194.6 million dollars. In 
the context of declining revenues from mineral exports, investment in labour-intensive 
manufacturing has been a key growth area for North Korea. Some of this investment has been 
for the purposes of targeting North Korean domestic demand in consumer goods, electrical 
appliances, food manufacturing, construction materials, etc. More importantly in terms of 
foreign currency earnings, however, has been the expansion of export-oriented manufacturing 
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within North Korea, which has served to integrate the country into regional and global 
production networks despite stringent international sanctions. Investment in North Korean 
manufacturing for export typically takes the form of consignment-based processing (CBP), 
whereby Chinese enterprises supply the funds, production equipment and materials while 
North Korean companies provide the workers. The finished products are then re-exported 
back to China. CBP-based production of clothing and related items (HS 61, 62) has seen 
particularly rapid growth in recent years, from US$ 186.42 million in 2010 to US$ 799.3 
million dollars in 2015, forming 32.3 per cent of North Korea's total exports to China. 
 
This integration of North Korea into regional and global production networks has occurred 
mainly as a result of rising labour costs within China. This reflects in part the dynamic 
whereby social struggles at the point of production and the threat that they pose to social and 
political stability have led to government reforms designed to manage tensions through 
piecemeal reform from above. More specifically, the potential of labour unrest as 
demonstrated in China's 2010 strike wave along with the manner in which the global 
financial crisis exposed the vulnerabilities of the country's export-dependent industrialisation 
model have led to a shift in government strategy away from export-oriented manufacturing 
towards increasing domestic consumption (Gray & Jang 2015). China has thus seen rapid 
increases in the minimum wage and enterprises have been faced with further costs related to 
social insurance payments and other employee benefits. Demographic shifts associated with 
the one child policy have added to difficulties faced by Chinese firms in recruiting workers 
(Cai 2007). 
 
For clothing manufacturers in the more prosperous coastal provinces, the challenge of rising 
wages has led to spatial relocation of production either to China's inland/western regions or to 
overseas low-wage sites (Zhu & Pickles 2014). However, the latter strategy of "going out" 
has increasingly been adopted by clothing manufacturers in the northeast, particularly in the 
border regions adjacent to North Korea. Indeed, China's northeast has by no means been 
spared from the rapid increases in wages. In 2010 alone, for example, the average minimum 
wage in Liaoning province rose by 28.6 per cent, in Jilin province by 26.2 per cent, and in 
Heilongjiang province by 29.4 per cent (Jin et al. 2012, p.12). Though labour shortages first 
emerged in the coastal export-oriented industrial regions, they have subsequently spread to 
China's inner provinces, to the West, and to the northeast. Despite increases in wages, 
northeastern labour-intensive factories in the clothing and footwear sectors, for example, 
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have reportedly experienced greater hardship in recruiting workers, with some of them 
operating at less than half of their capacity. Dandong city has experienced one of the most 
serious labour shortages in Liaoning province, and the number of apparel companies in the 
city in the early 2010s has declined from 120 to 70 (Choi et al. 2015, p.109). 
 
As such, North Korea has come to perform the role of spatial fix for a number of China's 
northeastern clothing manufacturers in terms of providing manufacturers with new sources of 
low-cost labour without exposing them to the risks of direct investment in the country. In the 
context of the continued slowdown of the northeastern economy, CBP-based production has 
been supported by regional governments. For example, several major clothing manufacturers 
in Hunchun and Dandong cities have acquired official permits for the newly excised 
preference trade system of cross-border processing work from the customs authorities so that 
these local companies only have to pay 20 per cent of customs duties from 2013 when re-
importing finished clothing items back into China from North Korea (People’s Daily 2013). 
Furthermore, the Jilin provincial authorities regard clothing manufactured in North Korea 
under this CBP arrangement as domestically produced, thereby giving them preference in 
terms of quality and safety inspections (Bae & Yoon 2015, pp.167–168; Choi et al. 2015, 
pp.108–109).   
 
In addition to CBP-based production, there has also since the early 2010s been a marked rise 
in the dispatch of North Korean workers to China's northeast, and particularly to border cities 
such as Dandong Though CBP-based production is a less risky arrangement than direct 
investment for Chinese firms, the use of dispatched North Korean labour represents a further 
reduction of risk. Indeed, there have been widespread reports of the difficulties faced by 
Chinese enterprises operating in North Korea. Chinese enterprises generally fear the 
appropriation of their businesses and have significant concerns about poor infrastructure in 
the country as well as arbitrary changes in rules and practices (Haggard & Noland 2012). The 
strict quarantine procedures put in place during the winter of 2015-16 in response to the 
Ebola crisis demonstrates further how seemingly arbitrary actions taken by the North Korean 
authorities can greatly inconvenience Chinese investors (Abrahamian 2015). The dispatch of 
North Korean labour to production sites in China thereby helps to mitigate such risks. 
The direct employment of North Korean workers by Chinese manufacturers is a relatively 
new phenomenon. The Liaoning provincial government reached an agreement with the North 
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Korean authorities in April 2012 to allow 20,000 North Koreans to work as "industrial 
trainees" in Chinese factories. This followed a similar agreement made by Jilin provincial 
government to resolve labour shortages in several Jilin border cities (Chosun Ilbo 2012). 
While there are no accurate statistics available, a fieldwork report by Jong-Seok Lee of the 
Sejong Institute indicates that there are currently around 70,000-80,000 North Korean 
workers in China (Lee 2016, p.10). In the past, small groups of North Koreans tended to work 
primarily in the service sector, and in restaurants in particular, but more recently, this has 
expanded to textiles, timber processing, machinery assembly, fisheries processing, 
construction and IT sectors. In the Dandong region alone, there are estimated to be around as 
many as 30,000 workers (Choi 2016, p.104), largely in unskilled jobs in clothing, seafood, 
wood product, and construction material factories. A further 9,000 North Korean workers are 
estimated to be employed in Jilin's Yanbian Autonomous Prefecture. iii  Some of these 
operations are reported to be quite large in scale. With the support of Hunchun city 
government, for example, China’s largest manufacturer of men's clothes, the Youngor Group 
established a factory in the city’s industrial zone in 2015 (Bae & Yoon 2015, p.170). In 2016, 
the employment of 1,500 North Korean workers made up around 75 per cent of the total 
workforce, and there are plans to raise this to 5,000 North Korean workers in the near future.iv 
In addition to low-wage unskilled labour, North Korea has also dispatched relatively highly 
skilled IT workers in line with North Korea's comparative strengths in software development 
and animation. For example, Dandong's Dongfang Measurement and Control Technology Co. 
have employed 40-50 doctoral researchers from the (North) Korean Academy of Sciences.
v
 
Furthermore, recent media reports suggest that there are more than 2,400 North Korean IT 
workers in the Chinese northeast, including about 1,000 workers in Yanji of Jilin Province 
and 500-600 workers in Shenyang, Liaoning Province (Yonhap 2016). 
 
Local governments have played a key role in facilitating this process. In 2012, for example, 
the Tumen authorities signed an agreement with the DPRK Joint Venture and Investment 
Committee (Chosŏn t’ujahabyŏng wuiwŏnhoe) to dispatch 20,000 North Korean workers to 
city's newly established Chosun Industrial Park (Heilongjiang News 2013). The actual 
number of North Korean workers employed there have grown rapidly from 625 at the end of 
2013 to around 4,000 in August 2016 (Lee 2016; Choi 2016, p.104). As Chinese enterprises 
have put pressure on local governments to permit the employment of North Korean workers, 
those local governments have also competed with each other. Following the approval by the 
Tumen municipal authorities for Chosun Industrial Park to employ North Korean labour, 
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Hunchun, a neighbouring city, signed a separate contract with North Korean labour supplier 
Chosun Rungnado Company to supply North Korea workers (Kim 2014). In any case, the 
employment of North Korean workers is largely a local-level initiative. The central Chinese 
government has not formally expressed its position on such practices, though as with local 
efforts to promote exchange with North Korea more generally, it appears that it is showing a 




While China’s rise has led to an increase in the country’s influence within the structures of 
global economic and political governance, it continues to pursue a strategy of engagement 
with North Korea despite Beijing's support of increasingly stringent UN-mandated sanctions. 
As we have argued, contemporary analyses of this apparent paradox are arguably constrained 
by their state-centric analytical frameworks that serve to reduce relations between the two 
countries to realpolitik considerations or to relatively static norms. Such views neglect, 
however, the ongoing multi-faceted transformation of the Chinese state since the late 1970s, 
and in particular, the profound rescaling of political authority along with the diversification of 
public and private actors involved in the conduct of relations with neighbouring countries. As 
the key agents involved in Sino-North Korean economic relations have seen a relative shift 
from central to local government and to local enterprises, relations between the two countries 
are increasingly characterised by multiple and at times contradictory goals. Certainly, the 
relative autonomy of the local governments should also not be exaggerated as the extent to 
which regional authorities can adopt policies that directly contradict the intentions of Beijing 
is highly constrained and it would be misleading to view regional initiatives in external 
affairs as in direct conflict with the policies of the central government (Cheung & Tang 2001, 
p.93). Nonetheless, the emergence of a multi-scalar political structure has meant that China’s 
approach to North Korea is irreducible to any single geopolitical logic and is instead 
characterised by a multiplicity of goals that compete for dominance.  
This process of the rescaling of political and economic governance in China has been central 
to the country’s post-1978 reforms. At the same time, however, it has served to exacerbate 
China’s internal uneven development, raising issues of internal migration, labour unrest, 
wage rises, and shortages of workers. This dynamic has led to a process whereby central and 
local governments have sought to facilitate cross-border relations with North Korea as a 
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means of reviving the northeast and tackling the limits to capital accumulation by means of 
the spatial fix. While the Chinese central government's regional development plans have had 
mixed results, local governments in the border regions have made continued efforts to 
facilitate trade and investment through such efforts as Dandong's free trade zone and 
Hunchun's industrial park. State-led initiatives aside, decentralisation and marketisation have 
also meant that economic relations between China and North Korea are increasingly 
underpinned by trade and investment conducted by small private businesses based in the 
northeast rather than by SOEs. As such, the true story of Sino-North Korean economic 
engagement is one of micro-regionalism driven by local actors. This means that despite 
Beijing's apparent displeasure with North Korea's nuclear programme, the importance of 
North Korean for China's domestic stability and particularly for the revitalisation of the 
northeastern border regions means that it seems unlikely that this will do much to reverse the 
situation in which Sino-North Korean relations are being driven by private enterprises, 
underpinned by local governments and public and private companies.  
Certainly, Beijing can and does take actions aimed at expressing its displeasure with 
Pyongyang over its nuclear and missile tests. China's banning of coal imports from North 
Korea in 2017 is one such example, though it remains to be seen as to the extent to which this 
ban will be enforced and whether it will simply drive more of the trade into the realm of the 
informal economy. A stringent application of the ban would no doubt have a significant 
impact on North Korea's foreign exchange earnings, though it should be noted that economic 
exchange in other areas, including the outsourcing of apparel manufacturing, has continued to 
grow and trade in minerals banned under UN sanctions is still reportedly taking place 
(Yonhap 2017). As such, the substance of Sino-North Korean relations is likely to continue to 
follow market dynamics rather than the vicissitudes of high politics between Beijing and 
Pyongyang.  
Though not primarily the focus of this paper, this analysis has important implications for 
thinking about potential alternative strategies of engagement with North Korea. China's 
engagement with the country has taken on quite a different form to the more territorially-
motivated engagement strategy pursued by the South Korean government under the auspices 
of the erstwhile Sunshine Policy (1998-2006). China's appproach has been much more based 
around interaction between local actors in both countries. There has been more in the way of 
business-to-business interaction and, as a result, people-to-people contact. South Korean 
engagement on the other hand was conducted through much more constrained channels. 
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Encounters between North and South Koreans were more strictly regulated, and as a result, 
there was less space for any transformative impact. Though South Korean local governments 
did participate in inter-Korean exchange, their counterpart was often more likely to be the 
North Korean central government (Marumoto 2008). Indeed, it was partly the highly 
constrained nature of inter-Korean exchange that led it to be criticised by South Korean 
conservatives (Son 2009). As a result, it can be argued that China's engagement with North 
Korea has served to encourage the ongoing process of marketisation in the latter, and indeed, 
there is evidence to suggest that North Korea is in the process of copying market institutions 
found in China (Reilly 2014). This grassroots exchange has played a key role in the broader 
recovery of the North Korean economy. There are signs that North Korean society is 
becoming more pluralistic, and that an entrepreneurial class may be emerging: if so, a 
profound transformation is underway in the country. This serves to underline the fact that in 
the context of the increasingly tense stand of between North Korea and the United States, an 
appreciation of the multi-scalar dimensions of potential engagement strategies may provide 
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